University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1977

Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change
Timothy J. Sullivan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sullivan, Timothy J., "Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change" (1977). Minnesota Law
Review. 2442.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2442

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change
Timoihy J. Sullivan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages' traditionally have been awarded in a variety of tort actions, 2 but it has long been presumed that punitive
damages are not available in the standard action for breach of
contract. 3 Recently, however, commentators have perceived an
increase in the number of contract cases in which punitive damages have been awarded,4 and have attempted to elucidate the
reasons for this purported shift in the law. Some suggest that
the greater availability of punitive damages is aimed at punishing
abusive conduct against plaintiffs with relatively weak bargaining power by defendants possessing greater economic leverage. 5
Professor Gilmore contends that approval of punitive damage
awards in contract actions is a particular illustration of a more
general phenomenon; the reabsorption of contract law into the
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
It is unusual to include a dedication in an Article of this modest
scope. For reasons compelling to the author, however, this Article is dedicated to his grandfather, Judge Albert L. Caris of the Common Pleas
Court of Portage County, Ohio. For thirty years he was a trial lawyer
of unexcelled ability; for twenty-five more he has been a trial judge of
great learning and great humanity. He has honored the law.
1. Punitive damages, sometimes called exemplary damages or
"4smart money" have been defined as a sum not designed principally to
compensate the plaintiff for pecuniary loss, but rather to punish the defendant for willful and malicious conduct and to serve as a deterrent
to other potential tortfeasors.

§ 77, at 275-76 (1935).
2. W. PROSSER,
ed. 1971).

C.

McCoRMIcK,

HANDBOOK OF

=H LAW OF

THm

LAW

OF

DAMAGES
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5 A. Comm, CoNTRAcTs, § 1077 (1964).
4. 2 S. WLLISTON, A TREATISE oN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Con3.

tract, 20 Onio ST. L.J. 284 (1959); Note, The Expanding Availability of

Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975); Note,
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q.
444 (1958); Note, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WiLLAM E
L.J. 137 (1971).
5. See Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in
ContractActions, 8 IND. L. Ruv. 668, 678-81 (1975).
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main body of tort law from which contract principles emerged
more than a century ago. 6
This Article will evaluate the assertion that punitive damages for breach of contract are more readily available now than
in the past. This requires an inquiry into the history of punitive
damages and the reasoning of older cases which were decided
in accordance with traditional rules that discouraged such awards
in contract actions. A broader but related question will also be
addressed: do decided contract cases in which punitive damages
have been awarded produce results consistent with the general
aims of contract damage law?
II.
A.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

ENGLAND

The historical origins of punitive damages are best understood in connection with the development of the jury as a judicial
institution and the evolution of damage law as a part of the English legal system. While this is not a place for a lengthy historical treatment of legal institutions whose origins and development
have been ably described elsewhere, 7 some attention to the historical perspective is necessary to an accurate evaluation of the
modern cases treating punitive damages in contract law.
The award of pecuniary damages came late in the development of the common law; rules for controlling the assessment of
damages came even later.8 Most suits in the early royal courts
were proprietary in character; that is, the plaintiff's objective
was not to receive a judgment for some pecuniary sum but rather
to obtain a judicial declaration establishing his entitlement to the
return of some species of property of which he had been deprived.9 Although there were some actions resulting in what
modern lawyers might call damage awards before the thirteenth
century,10 the rise of trespass at the beginning of that century
6. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974).
7. See, e.g., 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-50
(7th ed. 1966); S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
358-61 (1969); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
106-38 (5th ed. 1956); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 46-84 (1898).
8. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAW Q.
REv. 345 (1931).
9. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 364-65.
10. The twelfth century novel disseisin actions occasionally resulted
in a kind of pecuniary award to the plaintiff in addition to the specific
relief requested. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 522-24 (2d ed. 1898). But cf. MnsoM, supra note 7, at 117-19.
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created the conditions that would ultimately make award of pecuniary compensation commonplace in Anglo-American law."
Acceptance of the idea that litigants should be entitled to an
award of damages gave rise to the perplexing problems of determining how such damages should be measured and by whom.
There were two alternatives: damages could be measured by a
pre-determined scale, or assessed according to the discretion of
some tribunal. 12 There was certainly tradition to support a system which measured damages by a fixed schedule. Early AngloSaxon law had developed a detailed system of fixed tariffs aimed
at compensating the victim of acts that would be classed as tortious or criminal under modern law.' a Yet despite such precedent, the King's courts rejected the fixed tariff approach to the
assessment of damages. The judges of the time, seeking to relieve themselves of as many difficult problems of damage law as
possible, 14 turned instead to the jury.' 5
Once the power to assess damages had been broadly committed to the discretion of the jury, there was, of course, no need
for lawyers or judges to concern themselves with elaborating
standards by which to measure the quantum of damages. It is
rare to find an English court discussing substantive principles of
11. Modern concepts of civil liability grew from actions in trespass.
McComrMcK, supra note 1, § 5, at 23 (1935).

note 7, at 244.

See also MsoM, supra

12. Washington, supra note 8, at 345.
13. These fixed tariffs were called wer, bot, and wite. The sum payable to the victim was strictly prescribed. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,

supra note 10, at 457-58. Aspects of the Anglo-Saxon law survived well
into the Norman period. PLUCxNETT, supra note 7, at 9.

14. The jury might have been considered little more than a body
of witnesses had the judges of the thirteenth century remained, like Bracton, conversant with canon or civil law. 1 HoLwswoaT, supra note
7, at 318. In the thirteenth century, however, judges were increasingly
drawn from practitioners before the royal courts. These men, lacking

much breadth of learning, MIsoM, supra note 7, at 29-30, were more

than willing to commit what we would consider judicial functions to the
jury: "Roper, in his life of More, tells us that More said of the judges,
'They see, that they may, by the verdict of the jury, cast off all quarrels
from themselves upon them, which they account their chief defence.'"

1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 318 n.2.

15. With the decline of the ancient methods of rendering judgments

-trial by ordeal or trial by battle-the jury assumed greater importance
in the early English legal system. Since the jury became a substitute
for the ancient methods of trial whose results were thought to be divinely
ordained, the jury's verdict at first "inherited the inscrutability of the
judgments of God." 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 317. At first,
the jury was composed of neighbors of the parties who either had personal knowledge of the facts or who might have the means to ascertain
the facts. Thus, early juries had a function not unlike that of witnesses.
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damage law until very near the end of the eighteenth century. 16
Because juries were capable of rendering verdicts that were either obviously excessive or grossly inadequate, however, the
courts had to devise some means of controlling and reviewing
jury verdicts. 17 Thus, the evolution of English damage law must
for some centuries be traced in judicial decisions that focus upon
the proper procedural means of controlling jury verdicts rendered in the absence of any significant substantive law of damages.
The writ of attaint' 8 was the first and, for a time, a most effective means of setting aside an erroneous verdict and punishing
the members of a jury which had rendered a false verdict. 19 The
origin of attaint is obscure, 20 but it is reasonably certain that attaint became available for an improper assessment of damages as
early as 1275.21 In particular cases, attaint offered the defendant
some protection against a runaway jury. Infirmities in the procedural incidents of attaint, however, made it an unlikely vehicle
for the creation of a rational damage rule structure. First, the
jury of attaint was an ad hoc body. Its impermanence made it
unlikely that any consistent rules of damage law would emerge
from its deliberations. 22 Second, as long as the petty jury retained a vestige of its witnessing functions, the jury of attaint
was forbidden to consider any evidence not before the petty jury
whose work it was reviewing. 23 These deficiencies as well as the
extreme severity of the penalty 24 attendant upon a finding by the
Indeed, special efforts were made to select a jury that had particular

knowledge of the transaction out of which the suit arose. THAYER,
supra note 7, at 93-94.
16. Washington, supra note 8, at 346.
17. Id. at 358.
18. The writ of attaint, analogous to the modern motion for a new
trial, permitted inquiry into a jury verdict, usually conducted by a grand
jury of 24 persons. If they found that the original verdict was false,
the correct judgment was entered and the attainted jurors suffered severe penalties. See note 24 infra. For a comprehensive treatment of
the writ of attaint, see Zane, The Attaint, 15 MICH. L. Rsv. 1, 127 (1916).
19. The law did not distinguish between verdicts that were consciously false and those that were the product of innocent or ignorant
mistake.

2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 542.

20. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 337.
21. THAYER, supra note 7, at 147.
22. Washington, supranote 8, at 349-50.
23.

1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 341.

24. The punishment for attainted juries was
[a]ll of the first jury shall be committed to the King's prison,
their goods shall be confiscated, their possessions seized into the
King's hands, their habitations and houses shall be pulled down,
their woodland shall be felled, their meadows shall be plowed up
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jury of attaint that the petty jury had rendered a false verdict,
25
made attaint obsolete by the sixteenth century.
With the decline of attaint, other doctrines of control evolved
and courts began gradually to assert the authority to revise a
jury's verdict. In its early stages, the judicial prerogative was
exercised cautiously and confined to a very narrow range of
cases. 26 As long as a jury retained some of its witnessing functions, no court could with confidence alter a jury's verdict, since
such a verdict was based, partially at least, upon knowledge peculiarly that of individual jurors.2 7 Only when the court had
certainty of information concerning the nature of an injury
would it presume to modify a jury damage award. Presumably
in cases brought on the writ of debt, the test of certainty of infor28
mation had been met, and a court could act to revise the verdict.
In cases which modern lawyers would classify as tort actions, however, requests for judicial revision of jury verdicts
were rejected on the ground that the court lacked the necessary
certainty of information. 29 Thus at the beginning of the seventeenth century, although judges had asserted some revisory powers, the authority of the jury effectively to render a final verdict
in most cases remained essentially intact.
The obsolescence of attaint and the timidity of common law
judges in asserting any general power of jury control produced,
if not a crisis in the legal system, at least a growing sensitivity
to the need for reform. Not for the first time in English history,
and they themselves forever thenceforward be esteemed in the
eye of the law infamous.
Quoted in PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 31. There is some evidence that
despite the severity of the prescribed penalties some attainted jurors
escaped with modest fines, 2 PoLLocK & MAiTLAND, supra note 10,
at 542.
25. 1 HoLDswoaRH, supra note 7, at 341-42.
26. Some authority for the proposition that judges had the power
to reverse jury verdicts could be found in the established practice of
courts to assess damages in cases where judgment had been given on
default, demurrer, or confession. Washington, supra note 8, at 351. The
development of legal doctrines increasing the court's power to revise
jury verdicts was influenced by the parallel evolution of rules governing the scope of judicial power to fix damages when a case was
resolved short of a submission to the jury.
27. 1 HOLDSWORTa, supra note 7, at 346.
28. Washington, supra note 8, at 356.
29. In Bonham v. Sturton, 73 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1554), the court
refused to reduce damages in a slander action. The court indicated that
the decision would have been otherwise had the plaintiff brought, for
example, an action in mayhem. In such a case the court could view
the damage and determine its extent with certainty.
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equity intervened. The chancellor began to order new trials at
law as a means of correcting improper jury verdicts.3 0 The response of the law judges was predictable: they also began to
grant new trials. In Bright v. Eynon,3 1 Lord Mansfield reviewed
the reasons for the change in policy:
Indeed, for a good while... the granting of new trials was
holden to a degree of strictness, so intolerable, that it drove the
parties into a Court of Equity, to have, in effect, a new trial at
law, of a mere legal question; because the verdict, in justice,
under all the circumstances, ought not to conclude .... And

therefore of late years, the Courts of Law have gone more liberally into the granting of new3 2trials, according to the circumstances of the respective cases.
It was not until 1655 in Wood v. Gunston,38 however, that a
new trial was granted simply on the ground of an improper damage award. The plaintiff in an action for slander had obtained
a judgment below for 1500 pounds. In opposing the defendant's
motion for a new trial, plaintiff's counsel argued that there were

no precedents on the books for granting a new trial simply on account of "the greatness of the damages."3 4 The court, while conceding that judicial power to grant new trials must be exercised

sparingly, nonetheless ordered a new trial at the next term. With
the decision in Wood, although the road ahead was not always
smooth, 5 the courts' power to order new trials on the ground
of an excessive damage award was established.
In exercising the power to set aside jury verdicts, however,

judges continued to distinguish between tort and contract cases,
manifesting a greater reluctance to set aside verdicts in tort

cases.3 6 An eighteenth century judge explained the differing
treatment of tort and contract cases in this fashion:
The utmost that can be said is, and very truly, that the same
rule does not prevail upon questions of tort, as of contract. In
contract the measure of damages is generally matter of account,
30. Washington; supra note 8, at 358.
31. 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (K.B. 1757).
32. Id. at 367.
33. 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
34. Id. Sargent Maynard, plaintiff's counsel, adopted the strategy
of any lawyer attempting to resist an onrushing tide of reform. He argued that this novel doctrine, new trial, ought not to be extended. He
warned against unnamed dangerous consequences should new trials be
granted in cases of this kind. He lost.
35. Wood was decided in the Commonwealth period. Its standing
as authority was for a time questioned. By 1726, however, the King's
Bench was granting new trials for excessive damages on a discretionary
basis. Washington, supra note 8, at 362-63.
36. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
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and the damages given may be demonstrated to be right or
wrong. But in torts a greater latitude is allowed to the jury:
and the damages must37be excessive and outrageous to require
or warrant a new trial.
It was against this background of judicial disinclination to meddie with jury verdicts in tort cases that the doctrine of punitive
damages emerged.
The principal case to which the origin of punitive damages
is traced is Huckle v. Money.3 8 Pursuant to an illegal warrant,
the plaintiff, a journeyman printer, had been wrongfully seized
by an agent of the King. Although while in custody he had been
"used very civilly" so that, in the court's opinion, only a small
personal injury had been done, the court, emphasizing that the
government's conduct had been outrageous-comparable even to
the Spanish Inquisition-held that the jury had been right in
awarding "exemplary damages." The court granted a new trial,
however, because the amount of the award was excessive, but
cautioned that in light of the government's culpable conduct, "it
must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a tort,
and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce
3' 9
a Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages"
In Tullidge v. Wade,40 the judges of the King's Bench reaffirmed their endorsement of the doctrine of punitive damages. A
large jury award to the plaintiff, whose unmarried daughter had
become pregnant by the defendant, was appealed. Chief Justice
Wilmot, in sustaining the verdict below, observed:
Actions of this sort are brought for example's sake; and although the plaintiff's loss in this case may not really amount
to the value of twenty shillings, yet the jury have done right
in giving liberal damages... if much greater damages had been
given, we should not have been dissatisfied therewith; the plaintiff having received this insult in his own house....41
Other early English cases applied similar reasoning in sus42
taining an award of punitive damages. In Merest v. Harvey,
for example, the defendant, while drunk, had attempted to join
in a private hunting party on plaintiff's land. The plaintiff refused to permit the defendant to hunt with him. The defendant,
undeterred, proceeded to fire off a number of rounds, even asking
the plaintiff to supply him additional ammunition. The plaintiff
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774).
95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
Id. at 769.
95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
Id.
128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814).
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was awarded 500 pounds. To the argument of defendant's counsel that the damages were excessive and should be set aside, the
court replied:
I wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every
principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to
restrain him except large damages? To be sure, one can hardly
conceive worse conduct than this. I do not know upon what
principle we can grant a rule in this case, unless we were to lay
it down that the jury are not justified in giving more than
the
43
absolute pecuniary damage that the Plaintiff may sustain.
The early decisions show that the acceptance of punitive
damages in English law was not the product of any deliberate judicial design. Some courts simply observed that in tort actions
large verdicts would be sustained because the character of tort
rules allowed greater jury discretion. 44 Only in the later cases
such as Merest4" did courts begin to justify large tort awards
which had no pecuniary basis by reference to the defendant's
egregious conduct or the principle that such judgments might
serve as warning symbols to potential tortfeasors. By the early
nineteenth century, then, the English law concept of punitive
damages had become a doctrine whose contours would be recognizable by twentieth century lawyers.
B.

THE UNITED STATES

Cases in which punitive damages were awarded are found
4
very early in the American reports. In Coryell v. Colbaugh,"
decided in the late eighteenth century, the New Jersey supreme
court sanctioned the award of punitive damages in an action for
a breach of promise to marry.47 In sustaining the correctness of
the trial judge's charge to the jury, the court emphasized the exemplary nature of such awards:
He [the trial judge] told the jury that they were not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual
loss; but to give damages for example's sake, to prevent such
offences in future ....

[He] told the jury they were bound to

no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would mark
their disapprobation, and be an example to others. 43
43. Id.
44. Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774); Beardmore v.
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793-94 (K.B. 1764).
45. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814).
46. 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791).
47. Although punitive damages were not readily awarded for
breach of contract, the breach of a contract to marry has been traditionally treated as an exception to the general rule. See notes 90-94 infra
and accompanying text.
48. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791) (emphasis
added).
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By the middle of the nineteenth century the award of punitive damages in tort was a well established part of the American
legal system. 49 From the beginning there was some confusion as
to whether punitive damages had any genuinely compensatory
function or whether they were designed solely to punish the defendant and to serve as an example to others.50 Although most
nineteenth century courts agreed in emphasizing the predominantly punitive character of exemplary damages, 51 some decisions stressed their compensatory character. 52 In Magee v. Holland,53 for example, the New Jersey supreme court permitted the
recovery of punitive damages as compensation for the wounded
feelings of a father whose children had been abducted. With
the increasing willingness of courts to permit separate recovery
in tort actions for injury to feelings, efforts to characterize punitive damages as even partially compensatory began to disappear.
By 1891, a leading treatise on damages concluded:
The allowance of exemplary damages gave rise for a time
to the notion that mental suffering was not a subject for compensatory damages. This notion has been generally abandoned. ... 54
Despite the general acceptance of the award of punitive damages in tort actions in a large majority of American jurisdictions,
there was a flurry of judicial criticism of the doctrine after 1850.
This general and sometimes critical reconsideration of the role of
punitive damages in the remedial rule structure was caused principally by a conflict of opinion between two of the major treatise
writers of the era. 55 Most judicial opinions on the subject
did not argue against punitive damages per se, but were concerned with determining the precise sort of injuries punitive
49. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379 (1866); Bell
v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68 (1854); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 377 (1854).
50. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv.
517, 520 (1957).
51. See, e.g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492 (1880); Stoneseifer v.
Sheble, 31 Mo. 243 (1860); Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 415 (1857); Smith
v. Sherwood, 2 Tex. 460 (1847); Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N.C. 440 (1836).
52. See, e.g., Ously v. Hardin, 23 Ill. 352 (1860); McNamara v. King,
7 Ill. 432 (1845); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
53. 27 N.J.L. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
54. 2 T. SEDGWIcK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 356
(8th ed. 1891).
55. The writers were Greenleaf and Sedgwick. The question which
divided them was whether damage law could properly serve any function other than compensation. Greenleaf argued that the law of damages
must serve a purely compensatory function. S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 242 n.1 (2d ed. 1848).
Sedgwick believed that damages might appropriately supply non-compensatory

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:207

damages were properly intended to measure. 56 This debate over
the nature of punitive damages was long and tedious. 57 Some
courts expressed a measure of hostility toward a broadly based
role for punitive damages in American law, but most of the decisions upheld, at least in some form, the validity of such damages in selected tort actions. 58 In only a few instances were punitive damages flatly prohibited, 59 and some courts which had
narrowly defined the appropriate scope of punitive damages
shortly overruled themselves by defining the reach of the doctrine more broadly. 60 In sum, at the end of the nineteenth century the vast majority of American jurisdictions recognized the
doctrine of punitive damages in some form.6 1
III.

DIVERGENT ASSUMPTIONS IN TORT AND CONTRACT
DAMAGE LAW

We have traced the remote historical origins and the more
recent development of the concept of punitive damages in English
and American law. We have still to consider the disparate philosophical assumptions which underlie damages in tort and damages in contract. To some extent, the different rules which govern tort and contract damage awards may be explained as accidents of history. Yet the differences between these rules were

needs. 2 T.

SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MAEAsum Or DAMAGES § 527
(5th ed. 1869). The differences between the two learned authors may
have largely been a matter of semantics. This was recognized by some
courts that had occasion to weigh their opposing views. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 387 (1886).
56. McKeon v. Citizens' Ry., 42 Mo. 79 (1867); Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342 (1873); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888).
57. The court's opinion in Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873), for
example, is 54 pages long. The court cites authorities as varied as Grotius, Pufendorf, and the Greek myth of Pelion and Ossa on Olympus.
58. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Shown, 48 Tenn. 302 (1870). The court
in Dougherty declared that punitive damages were wrong in theory, but
that Tennessee precedents established the legitimacy of the doctrine. Id.
at 306.
59. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Spokane Truck
&Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891).
60. See, e.g., Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895).
Mayer specifically overruled Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485
(1888).
61. Despite its general acceptance in some form, the role of punitive
damages has not been uncontroversial. See Walter & Plain, Punitive
Damages: A CriticalAnalysis, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 369 (1965). Since 1964,
the doctrine has been strictly limited in England. Rookes v. Barnard,
1 All E.R. 367 (A.C. 1964). See generally Hodgin & Veitch, Punitive
Damages-Reassessed,21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 119 (1972).
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also the product of conscious policy choices made by scholars,
lawyers, and judges. These choices and their consequences must
be understood before the judicial treatment of punitive damages
in contract cases may be fully appreciated.
A partial explanation for the continued legitimacy of punitive damages in tort law may be found in the historical nexus between tort and criminal law. Holmes remarked their common
origins; 62 the draftsmen of the Restatement of Torts note that
".. . unlike the law of contracts or of restitution, the law of torts,
which was once scarcely separable from the criminal law, has
within it elements of punishment or deterrence. ' ' 63 The persistence of punitive damages in tort law cannot, however, be ascribed
wholly to the historical truth that the criminal law, with its emphasis on punishment, shared common roots with the law of
tort.64 Despite the occasional contention that the function of tort
damages-absent an award of punitive damages-is purely compensatory, 65 the fact is that the distinction between punitive and
compensatory damages in tort law is illusory.66 So long as our tort
law is fault-centered and liability is dependent upon a demonstration of fault, even so-called compensatory damages will have
a punitive character. 67 Absent the need to discourage culpable
behavior, there is no compelling reason to extract compensation
for the plaintiff's injury from the defendant.
The argument of compensation explains what the plaintiff
in a tort action receives. It does not explain why the defendant
pays. The compensatory theory of tort law also fails to explain
why a plaintiff injured through the "fault" of a defendant is
compensated while other plaintiffs are not.6 8
Thus, the existence of punitive damages in the law of tort is not
simply an illogical anomaly in a larger body of damage rules otherwise grounded in notions of mere pecuniary compensation.
Punitive damages are but a more explicit recognition of the mani62. 0. HOLMES, THE CoMMoN LAW 39 (1881).
63. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 901, comment a, at
538 (1939).
64. See generally Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts,
43 COLUM. L. Rsv. 753, 967 (1943).
65. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Taber v. Hutson,
5 Ind. 332 (1854).
66. Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Compensatory Damages, 27
YALE L.J. 585, 591-93 (1918); Note, supra note 50, at 522.
67. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173,
1177 (1931).
68. Note, supra note 50, at 523 (footnote omitted).
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fold role of punishment in a system of liability for civil wrongs
which turns upon the concept of fault. 69
In contrast to the multiple purposes that damages in tort are
designed to serve, the object of contract damage law is compensation for pecuniary loss. The Restatement of Contracts, for example, declares flatly that punitive damages are not recoverable
for breach of contract, 70 and defines the measure of damages
available to a successful plaintiff as "the net amount of the
losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach
[of contract], in excess of savings made possible ..
.,,1
". Similarly, the standard expressed in the cases is that the aggrieved
plaintiff is only to be put in as good a position as performance
would have placed him. 72

There seems to be no room in such

a formulation for non-compensatory recoveries.
Why should punitive damages be considered appropriate in
tort and inappropriate in contract? One commentator has suggested that the law of contract developed as a necessary incident
of commercial life and speculated that non-compensatory puni73
tive damages may have no place in commercial transactions.
The traditional unavailability of punitive damages may be considered simply an accident of historical development.74 A part of
69. Viewed in a larger perspective, punitive damages may be considered a part of the law of restitution in that they serve to protect
against the unjust enrichment of the defendant. See McElwain v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966). The defendant
company in McElwain had failed to install available pollution control
equipment in its manufacturing plant. Presumably, the cost of paying
compensatory damages would be less than the cost of available equipment. The court held that on these facts punitive damages were appropriate. The cited case is one in which the loss to the plaintiff was less
than the gain derived by the defendant from its tortious conduct. In
such a case punitive damages serve to prevent the unjust enrichment of
the tortfeasor. See generally Morris, supra note 67, at 1185-88.
70. REsTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). Section 341 of the
RESTAT MENT does permit recovery for mental suffering in specific kinds
of contract actions. To this extent, the draftsmen of the RESTATEMEm
recognize the legitimacy of non-pecuniary compensation in breach of contract actions. It is interesting to note, however, that the draftsmen categorize this item of damage as close to the law of tort as possible. See
id. § 341, comment a.
71. Id. § 329.
72. See, e.g., Barett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg., 24 F.2d 329 (1st
Cir. 1928); Belisle v. Berkshire Ice Co., 98 Conn. 689, 120 A. 599
(1923); Brodsky v. Allen Hayosh Indus., 1 Mich. App. 591, 137 N.W.2d
771 (1965); Silverstein v. Duluth News-Tribune Co., 68 Minn. 430, 71
N.W. 622 (1897); 5 CoRaiN, supra note 3, § 992.

73. Simpson, supra note 4, at 284.
74. Washington, supra note 8, at 351-66. Since the amount of
plaintiff's loss in a contract action could be assessed with greater cer-
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the explanation may also lie in the fact that parties to a contract
create contractual obligations by an exercise of will; unlike the
commission of a tortious act, failure to discharge these self-imposed obligations does not inevitably violate objective standards
of societal conduct. 75 Since breach of contract usually abuses no
external standard of acceptable conduct, contract damages may
7
be thought to have no punitive function.
Careful analysis, however, suggests that damages in tort and
contract are similar in several respects. Professor Corbin, for example, explicitly recognizes the multiple purposes that are served
by the contract damage scheme, noting that contract damages not
only compensate for pecuniary loss, but also operate as a substitute for personal vengeance and act to deter other contract
breaches. 77 The functional purposes of contract damages, however, are obscured by a thick overlay of judicial decisions and
scholarly commentary which uncritically recite that the object
of damages in contract is solely to compensate for pecuniary loss.
Reliance on that shibboleth obscures the process of contract damage measurement and disguises the multiple purposes such damage awards are intended to further. What is compensation in a
particular case? How can we know the true quantum of the
plaintiff's loss? The invocation of a pecuniary compensation
standard does not transform the inexact process of judicial inquiry into high science. In truth, the award of money damages
in contract frequently constitutes nothing more than the calculation of a sum based upon uncertain speculation.78 Such damage
tainty, courts were more willing to set aside as "excessive," jury awards
in such suits. It was judicial reluctance to abrogate large awards in tort
actions, where the losses were often less tangible, which set the stage
for the development of later principles of punitive damages. See notes
28-29 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Hall, supra note 66, at 755.
76. "The motive for the breach commonly is immaterial in an action
on the contract." Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S.
540, 547 (1902) (Holmes, J.) (citations omitted).
77. 5 CoRmnu, supra note 3, § 1002. Tort recovery is also intended
to substitute legal action for personal vengeance and to provide incentive
to avoid wrongdoing in the future. PRossER, supra note 2, § 4 at 17, § 5
at 23.
78. It is informed by a practical consideration of the probable
in life as the equivalent of the certain. If a crop is destroyed
before its maturity by the fault of a person, it is natural to
presume that the crop, properly cared for, would have been
harvested by its owner ....
In practice, life imposes the necessity of considering as true that which is probable. ...
Demogue, supra note 66, at 588-89 (footnote omitted). The fact that we
have chosen to make specific performance an exceptional remedy in our
scheme of contract damages means that we are forced to the hazardous
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awards may have no avowedly punitive character, but since the
precise extent of plaintiff's loss is often uncertain, can we say
that damages in contract serve no purpose beyond recompense for
79
pecuniary loss?
The careful, comparative analysis of damages in tort and contract has a curious effect. The once clear lines between punitive
and compensatory damages seem to blur and, occasionally, to disappear. The black letter rules which distinguish sharply between contract and tort damages sometimes obscure more than
they reveal. We know that punitive damages are said to be alien
to contract law; yet at a functional level contract damages may
have a punitive effect. This is not to say that a contract damage
award which gives more than a compensatory recovery is punitive in the strict tort law sense. It is true, however, that
every dollar recovered in a contract action in excess of actual
pecuniary loss is inconsistent with the stated aim of contract
damage law. From the defendant's perspective the difficulty of
measuring precise pecuniary loss can mean a judgment that is
theoretically improper in a contract suit. The law's sanctioning
such a recovery may not be intentionally punitive, but from the
defendant's point of view, it is punitive in effect.
IV.
A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACT: THE CASES

SOME EARLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE

The reports yield a multitude of cases which lend support to
the general rule that punitive damages may not be recovered in
contract. Abundant citations, both old s0 and new,8 1 support that
task of predicting how the transaction might have turned out.

See

Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLum. L. REv.

1145, 1146-47 (1970).
79.

The draftsmen of the RISTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS were sensitive

to the fact that so-called compensatory awards may not always be exact
approximations of actual loss. The draftsmen observe, however, that
"[tjhe fact that damages are sometimes awarded in spite of uncertainty
in the extent of the harm does not make them punitive." REsTATEM ET
OF CONTRAcTS § 342, comment b (1932). The discomfort of the draftsmen
is understandable in light of the RESTATEmFNT'S position that punitive

damages are not available in contract. Id. § 342. The problem is not
resolved by comment b. The purpose of the damage award that exceeds
compensation may not be punitive, but its effect is surely punitive.
80. See, e.g., Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355 (1858); Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9 (1859); Snow v. Grace, 25 Ark. 570 (1869); Burnett v.
Edling & Edling, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 711 (1898).
81. See, e.g., Seneca Falls Machine Co. v. McBeth, 246 F. Supp. 271
(W.D. Pa. 1965); Eskew v. Camp, 130 Ga. App. 779, 204 S.E.2d 465
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black letter proposition. It is nonetheless wrong to assume that
the law of punitive damages in contract is settled. It is doubtful
that the barriers to recovery of such damages in contract
were ever as insurmountable as some of the treatises and many
of the cases suggest.8 2 Within the last, decade, however, the pace
of change in punitive damages rules has accelerated significantly.
While the impact of this change has not touched every jurisdiction with equal force, enough new law has been made by a sufficient number of courts that the broad outlines of a new body of
rules are discernible.
Although the doctrine of punitive damages is part of the
larger body of remedial rules, one of the principal impediments
to analysis of contract cases treating the question of punitive
damages is the consistent absence, particularly in the early cases,
of any meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of damage law. This may be because many judges are by nature not
philosophers of the law; it may be a reflection of the fact that
damage rules developed late in the history of the common law.83
Whatever the explanation, we must begin without any firm idea
of why, beyond adherence to traditional English standards,
American courts have held, as a general rule, that punitive damages should not be awarded for breach of contract.
Many of the older decisions that rejected the award of punitive damages in contract and troubled to cite any authority
84
at all made summary reference to the treatises then popular.
An examination of the treatise cited is likely to produce no more
enlightenment than the opinion which invoked its authority.8 5
Perhaps part of the difficulty is suggested by the decision of
(1974); King v. Insurance Co. of North America, 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d
891 (1968); Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Outerbridge, 42 Misc. 2d 756, 249 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959).
82. See 11 WnLwsTON, supra note 4, § 1340.
83. Washington, supra note 8.
84. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cartwright Creek Tel. Co., 128
Ky. 395, 407, 108 S.W. 875, 878 (1908) (citing 2 J. SuTEMLAND, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 390 (3d ed. 1884)); Horton's Estate v. Sherwin,

63 Okla. 259, 259-60, 164 P. 469, 470 (1917) (citing 3 W. ELLIOTT, A TREATiSE ON THE LAw or CoxTaAcTs § 2124 (1913)); Peterson v. Thomas, 24
S.W. 1124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) (citing 1 T. SEI wIcx, A TREATISE oN THE
MEASuRE or DAMAGES § 370 (8th ed. 1891)).
85. See, e.g., 1 SEDGwcx, supranote 54, § 370. It has been suggested
that the development of English contract law in the nineteenth century
owed much to the exertions of treatise writers of the period who themselves borrowed heavily but discreetly from continental sources. Simp-
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the Texas supreme court in Houston & T.C. R.R. Co. v. Shirley, 6
in which the court rejected the award of punitive damages in
contract, stating:
The exclusion of such issues [punitive damages] in suits on contract may be justified on the policy of limiting the uncertainties
and asperities attending litigation of such issues, to that class of
cases in which the nature of the wrong complained of renders
those issues and evils to some extent unavoidable.7
The court may have intended to say that difficulty in assigning
a value to the personal interests litigated in torts justifies noncompensatory recoveries, while the typical contracts case, arising
in a commercial context where the amount of loss is more easily
fixed, does not invite the imposition of such damages. The
court's meaning is unclear, but it attempted, at least, to treat the
policy questions underlying the problem of punitive damages in
contract.
The modern decisions, commonly citing without discussion
the earlier cases decided in the jurisdiction, are of little more
help.8 8 All of this is not mere scholarly discontent with unreflective courts. The absence of clearly articulated reasons for a rule
makes any attempt to explicate the relationships among the cases
which purport to apply that rule doubly difficult. Some courts,
in their more candid moments, have conceded as much. 89
Even stated in its most unqualified form, the rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in a contract action was never
thought to apply without exception. Perhaps the earliest and
most widely recognized exception to the general rule is found
in actions for breach of contract to marry. Although it was not
a universal practice, 90 many courts sustained the award of punison, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAw Q. REv.
247, 250-58 (1975). No similar study of the influence of treatise writers
on the development of American contract law has been produced. In
view of the frequent citations to treatises by nineteenth century courts
in the area of damage law under study here, the possibility of an American phenomenon equivalent to that described by Professor Simpson in
England is very real.
86. 54 Tex. 125 (1880).
87. Id. at 142.
88. See, e.g., Deming v. Buckley's Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 245
(W.D. Ark. 1961). Some modern courts have troubled to discuss the
broader policy issues raised by the award of punitive damages in contract law. Aslip Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta, 6 Ill. App. 3d 65, 284
N.E.2d 509, 512 (1972); DeLeon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965).

89. See Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla.
1975).
90. See Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958).
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tive damages in such cases. 9 1 The justification for permitting
these awards rests mainly upon the peculiar nature of the interests invaded by breach of a contract to marry. Because the damage suffered by the plaintiff is often uniquely personal, 2 the
character of the interest abused frequently has much more in
common with a typical tort action than with the standard contract action.9 3 Courts have been sensitive to the fact that injuries suffered by a plaintiff in such cases are difficult if not
impossible to measure and have committed the question of damage assessment to the jury without clear instructions regarding
the standards to be applied in computing the amount of the recovery.94
Although the special nature of contracts to marry has furnished the justification for relaxing the prohibition against
award of punitive damages, courts do not agree on the standard
of wrongdoing that must be established before punitive damages
may be awarded in such a case. Some courts seem to require a
showing of fraudulent conduct or intent;9 5 others insist upon
proof of malice; 96 a few permit recovery if the defendant has
9 7
acted ruthlessly.
Another early and widely recognized exception to the general
rule that punitive damages are not available in contract was
based on judicial acceptance of the notion that public service
companies may be answerable in exemplary damages for failure
to discharge their obligations to the public. While the origin of
this exception to the general rule may be traced back into distant
English history, 8 it is sufficient to note that English law early
91.

See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926);

Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 124 P. 1083 (1912).

92. See Klitzke v. Davis, 172 Wis. 425, 179 N.W. 586 (1920).
93. See Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Brown
v. Douglas, 104 Ga. App. 769, 122 S.E.2d 747 (1961).
94. Tamke v. Vangsness, 72 Minn. 236, 75 N.W. 217 (1898); Ferguson
v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341 (1897).
95. Syfert v. Solomon, 95 Cal. App. 228, 272 P. 810 (1928); Finkelstein v. Barnett, 17 Misc. 564, 40 N.Y.S. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
96. Jacoby v. Stark, 205 Ill. 34, 68 N.E. 557 (1903); Osmun v. Winters, 30 Ore. 177, 46 P. 780 (1896).
97. Sneve v. Lunder, 100 Minn. 5, 110 N.W. 99 (1907); Dupont v.
McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925 (1886). Careful distinctions among concepts as amorphous as fraud, malice, and ruthlessness are, of course, difficult if not impossible to maintain. Many courts do not insist upon
maintaining such artificial distinctions. See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 120
Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926).

98.

Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the

Trust Problem, 17 HAav. L. REv. 156, 217, 1:56-59 (1904).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:207

recognized that those engaged in public or common callings9 " had
an obligation to serve all applicants for their services. In addition
to this primary obligation, early English law also imposed certain
supplemental duties, such as the requirement that service or
treatment be reasonably adequate and provided on reasonable
terms. 10 0 Legal rules governing the common callings were
shaped by the need to protect the public against exploitation or
oppression by the providers of important public services. These
legal duties were imposed because, under the economic conditions
then prevailing, the innkeeper, surgeon, or smith engaged in a
common calling very likely enjoyed a monopoly position within
the community. 1 1
In modern society, it is not the barber or tailor but the common carrier or public utility that enjoys monopoly or quasimonopoly power. Thus, the rules governing the availability of
a modern plaintiff's cause of action against a public utility or
common carrier are an outgrowth of the English law of common
callings. A typical earlier American case might have involved
the purchaser of a railroad ticket who was not transported to the
proper station. 10 2 Such plaintiffs would frequently seek an
award of punitive damages. The defendant's principal defense
was likely to be that its issuance of a ticket to the plaintiff created a contractual duty for the breach of which punitive damages
could not be recovered. The judicial response to that defense was
usually to point to the plaintiff's right, at his election, to bring
an action in contract or in tort:
It is therefore necessary to consider whether the action is one
arising ex contractu or ex delicto ....
The contract is stated
as an inducement to the action, as the foundation of plaintiff's
right to be on the train, to show that the plaintiff was lawfully
there. It next charges that without consent of plaintiff the railroad company willfully and wrongfully, and with disregard of
its duty to plaintiff, failed and refused to stop its train.. . and
carried plaintiff beyond his destination ....
Here is not only
a breach of contract and a violation of public duty by the plain99. Among common callings recognized in the fifteenth century
were the trades of barber, surgeon, smith, tailor, innkeeper, victualler,
carrier, and ferryman. Id. at 160. The modem law of public service monopolies may be traced to the legal rules which emerged from the regulation of those engaged in common callings.
100. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service
Companies,11 COLUm. L. REv. 514, 616, 743, 515 (1911).
101. Wyman, supra note 98, at 160-61. But see Burdick, supra note
100, at 515-24.
102. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Southern Ry., 140 N.C. 123, 52 S.E. 263
(1905); Ft. Smith & W. Ry. v. Ford, 34 Okla. 575, 126 P. 745 (1912).
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tiff in error as
a common carrier, but a willful, deliberate, con103
scious wrong.

It was thus the railroad's breach of duty to the public and not
its failure to discharge obligations assumed by private contract
which justified the award of punitive damages. By characterizing the plaintiff's action as one for tortious breach of a public
duty, the courts were able to permit these recoveries without
seeming insult to the general rule that such awards were not
appropriate in contract actions.' 0 4
The careful distinction drawn by numerous courts between
actions in tort and actions in contract has not always been easy
to maintain. The facts of many cases are not subject to ready
classification; the "border land" between tort and contract is
treacherous territory for even the ablest courts and commentators. 10 5 A court which insists upon drawing a bright line between the two actions occasionally produces an opinion of uncommon obscurity. 0 6 In the common carrier cases, especially
when the injury alleged could only be categorized as basically
contractual, additional reasons were needed to buttress the award
of punitive damages. Sometimes, surprisingly, those reasons
were found in the candid appraisal of the special legal responsibilities that great political and economic power imposed upon a
major monopoly enterprise:
103. Ft. Smith & W. Ry. v. Ford, 34 Okla. 575, 578, 126 P. 745, 746
(1912).
104. See Carmichael v. Bell Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911);
Davis v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 104 S.C. 63, 88 S.E. 273 (1916); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
But see Goins v. Western R.R. of Ala., 68 Ga. 190 (1881); DeWolf v. Ford,
193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908). Some of the early cases which denied
recovery of punitive damages in public service cases may be more readily explained on the grounds that defendant's conduct was not sufficiently malicious or willful to entitle plaintiff to recovery of punitive
damages even in a conventional tort case. See Thomas v. Peterson, 24
S.W. 1125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
105. The exceptional difficulties inherent in the process of classifying
an action as tort or contract have been perceived by great figures in each
of these two legal fields. See 5 CoRBin, supra note 3, § 1077; PROSSER,
The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW
OF

TORTS 380 (1953).

106. A good example of judicial gymnastics may be found in Trout
v. Watkins Livery & Undertaking Co., 148 Mo. App. 621, 634, 130 S.W.
136, 140 (1910), where the court observes, in discussing the liabilities of
common carriers:
In such circumstances the breach of contract gives rise to the
tort; not, however, because it was wrong to breach the contract,
but only because the law laid an obligation upon the carrier to
perform his duty .. . and he had breached the obligation imposed by law which, in the particular instance, arose from the
relation created by contract. In such cases, where there is an
obligation imposed both by contract and by law upon the carrier
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Many of the great railway systems of the country were built
with the aid of government ... subsidies ....
Also, it is with
money collected from the public that the railroad companies are
enabled to pay high salaries and compensation to officers, attorneys, political agents, and other talented and skillful men to
107
manage the business of the railroad companies ....

At bottom, then, the fundamental justification for the award of
punitive damages in public service corporation cases has been the
desire to both punish and protect against the abuse of economic
power.
Certain distinctive elements in both promise to marry and
public service cases help explain why they were exceptions to
the general rule. 0 8 In both types of cases, the courts have made
room for punitive damages by casting their decisions more in the
language of tort than of contract. In actions for breach of promise to marry this is possible because the interest invaded is typically highly personal; in public service corporation cases, a long
and respectable historical usage permits a finding that there has
been a breach of duty independent of contractual relations. Moreover, in the public service cases the defendant has usually been
guilty of conduct which constitutes the abuse of economic power
independent of the defendant's status as a party to a contract. 10 9
These early cases, which might appear to have but a restricted
relevance to the development of modern law, are the source of
ideas which have begun the transformation of the role of punitive
damages in the modern law of contract.
B.

BREACH OF A FIDUcIARY

DuTY

A number of courts have awarded punitive damages in actions involving breach of contract when the relationship between
the parties is of a fiduciary character. In these cases, as in
the public service cases, it is the breach of duty created by
the relationship rather than the contract which is said to permit
the recovery of punitive damages. Analyzed in this fashion, the
and the breach of the contract operates a tort though entailing
as well a breach of the obligation imposed by law, it is sometimes said the tort, though independent of, is, in a measure,
dependent upon, the contract.
107. Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 259, 134 P. 753, 761
(1913).
108. There were other minor, early exceptions to the general rule:
Some courts intimated that if the condition of a bond given in accordance
with statutory mandate is broken, punitive damages may be recoverable.
See, e.g., Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235 (1858); Richmond v. Schickler,
57 Iowa 486, 10 N.W. 882 (1881).
109. See 5 CoRBiN, supra note 3, § 1077.
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fiduciary duty cases are no more than innocent exceptions to the
general rule. Yet it remains a fact-not often emphasized in the
cases-that the relationship which established the duty was essentially the product of contractual agreement. The necessary
inquiry is to determine why, in a particular case, a court will emphasize the existence of a fiduciary duty and award punitive
damages for the egregious breach of the duty.
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Brown
v. Coates"0 presents a typical fact pattern in which punitive
damages for breach of a fiduciary duty growing out of contract
were held to be recoverable. The plaintiff was a homeowner who
contracted with the defendant real estate broker to exchange a
home owned by the plaintiff for one listed with the defendant.
The defendant was to sell the plaintiff's home and apply the
plaintiff's equity realized on the sale to the purchase price of
the plaintiff's new home. After selling the plaintiff's home, the
defendant denied that he had agreed to apply the net proceeds
from the sale to the purchase price of the new home. The trial
court awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the plain-

tiff.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. In an opinion by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, the
court acknowledged that punitive damages for the breach of an
ordinary contract are not favored in the law, but justified the
award on the ground that real estate brokers assume fiduciary
obligations toward their clients. The court pointedly refused,
however, to adopt "any single, particular formula in upholding
an award of punitive damages against a faithless agent," ' 1 but
went on to state that
once it has been shown that one trained and experienced
holds himself out to the public as worthy to be trusted for hire
...and those so invited do place their trust and confidence, and
that trust is intentionally and consciously disregarded, and exploited for unwarranted gain, community protection, as well as
that of2 the victim, warrants the imposition of punitive damages."
Although the court characterized the test it had framed as a narrow one," 3 the language quoted above is certainly susceptible of
flexible application.
110.
111.
112.
113.

253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
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The reach of Brown and other decisions' 14 that adopt similar reasoning is difficult to gauge. Rarely do courts attempt to
define the scope of the fiduciary duty which was allegedly
violated. Instead, attention is focused narrowly on the facts
at hand. Few of the decisions which permit the recovery of punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty or a duty of trust reflect sensitivity to the potential reach of the exception thus sanctioned.
A contrary line of decisions, not factually distinguishable
from the more liberal decisions typified by Brown, reflects a narrow view of the right to recover punitive damages for breach of
a fiduciary duty that is rooted in contract. 115 Courts that
take a hard line against the award of punitive damages for
breach of fiduciary duty often justify their holdings as necessary
to uphold the established principle that non-compensatory recoveries are inimical to the principles underlying standard contract
damage rules.
Typical of the cases which adopt a restrictive approach is
Ranco Fertiservice,Inc. v. Laursen." 6 In Ranco the plaintiff, a
distributor of tractors, sued defendant, a retail dealer in equipment supplied by plaintiff, for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff argued its entitlement to punitive damages on the
grounds that defendant had wrongfully misrepresented the number of tractors he had sold and had withheld sums rightfully belonging to plaintiff. The court conceded that the defendant had
breached a relationship of trust, but declared that since plaintiff's
action was in essence contractual the award of punitive damages
7
was improper."
The Ranco decision and others like it may be pejoratively
classified as wooden. The clear-cut categories of tort and con114. See PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1967); Harper v. Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Ore. 26, 120 P.2d 757 (1942). Cf. Rove Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974); Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 App. Div. 2d 278, 362
N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974). See also id. at 288, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 502, 505-06
(Hopkins, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956);
Burton v. Juzwik, 524 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1974). But see Burton v. Juzwik,
supra at 20-21 (Doolin, J., dissenting); Graham v. Turner, 472 S.W.2d
831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co.,
277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960); Zweifel v. Lee-Scherman Realty Co., 173
S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App. 1943).
116. 456 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1972).
117. Id. at 991.
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tract which the Ranco court professed to protect by its decision
are often illusory. If decisions such as Ranco treat legal abstractions as the whole of reality, however, courts such as Brown,
which take a more flexible view, may be fairly charged with judicial sleight of hand. It is disingenuous to treat cases which present breach of fiduciary duty in the contractual context as wholly
distinct from ordinary contract actions. To speak of "narrow
tests" as does Judge Burger in Brown suggests that phrases such
as "fiduciary relationships" and "relations of trust"" 8 have an
objective content. In reality such terms are almost as flexible as
a court wishes to make them." 9 Certainly a rational opinion
might have been written in the Brown case which denied a right
to recover punitive damages on the ground that plaintiff's complaint raised issues that were essentially contractual.
Thus, while Judge Burger chose to label plaintiff's claim as
one for breach of a fiduciary duty, the choice thus made was not
compelled by the immutable demands of some objectively comprehensible legal doctrine. The cases in this area of the law are
impossible to reconcile because the question in each is why a
particular judge held that particular facts implied or did not
imply the existence of a fiduciary duty. 120 Such questions go
to the heart of the judicial process and answers require insight
into forces more fundamental than the uncertain power of formal legal logic.
C.

CONTRACT BREACH ACCOMPANIED BY FRAUDULENT CONDUCT

The right to recover punitive damages for breach of contract
when the defendant's conduct is deemed concurrently fraudulent
is recognized in a number of jurisdictions as another exception
to the general rule.121 Since fraudulent conduct may cut across
118. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 38-39 (1958).
119. Phrases such as fiduciary relationship, relationship of trust, and
confidential relationship are used interchangeably by the courts; the definition of these terms is also vague, haphazard, and fragmentary. Bogert,
Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 237 (1928).

120. Attempts to harmonize results in this field almost always end
in failure. Even within the same jurisdiction conflicts are common.
Compare Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610
(1967), with Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956).
121. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal App. 2d 921,
71 Cal. Rptr. 764- (1968); Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind. App. 129, 192
N.E.2d 649 (1963); Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940);
Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904); Hooks v. Fitzenrieter,
76 Tex. 277, 13 S.W. 230 (1890).
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the whole range of contractual relations, this exception to the
general rule is of greater significance than the exceptional treatment accorded the breach of specialized contracts such as those
discussed in preceding sections. 1 22 The rule permitting recovery
of punitive damages for fraudulent breach of contract 123 is sometimes easier to state than to explain. This is partly the product of
legal history and partly the consequence of a tendency in our
legal system to rely on terms that are superficially precise but
flexible enough to permit differing results without the tooobvious appearance of inconsistency.
The word "fraud," for example, is a catch-all term which includes, depending upon the jurisdiction, a variety of actions
124
whose gravamen rests upon misrepresentation in some form.
125
The historical evolution of fraud is complex and confusing;
in
the hands of a creative court a "fraud" action may assume any
one of a bewildering array of different legal and equitable personalities. 1 26 In order to preserve the maximum freedom to deal
with an alleged fraud-feasor, courts sometimes have refused to
define the term:
Fraud assumes so many hues and forms, that courts are compelled to content themselves with comparatively few general
rules for its discovery and defeat, and -allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case to bear heavily upon the conscience and judgment of the court .... 127
122. See text accompanying note 108 supra. It is a mistake, however, to denigrate too much the role of punitive damages in cases of contracts to marry and contracts with public service companies as merely
a specialized backwater of historical interest. In fact, many of the most
recent cases which carve out a new role for punitive damages in contract
are very similar in their approach to the ideas expressed in the older
cases. Some recent articles on punitive damages in contract only summarily treat these important areas. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 67778.
123. For purposes of this Article the phrases "fraudulent breach of
contract" and "breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act" will
be used interchangeably. These are circumstances in which the two
terms may have significantly different legal effects, however, particularly if the phrase "breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act"
is determined to be an action in contract. See, e.g., Bourne v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937).
124.

PROSSER, supra note 2, at 684.

125. The historical development of actions for misrepresentationbreach of warranty, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation--are treated
in 1 T. STRzr, .THE FouNDATIoNs

OF

LEGA

LABnrrY 375-92 (1906), and

Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,24 HAnv. L. REV. 415,
415-17 (1911).
126. See Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. Rv. 749, 752 (1930).
127. Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S.C. 137, 139, 108 S.E. 189, 190 (1921)
(quoting 12 R.C.L., Fraud and Deceit, § 2, at 229 (1916)).
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The judicial freedom derived from a definition of fraud couched
in obscure terms exacts an important price: it makes the prediction of results in future cases, always a hazardous undertaking,
especially treacherous. Yet because punitive damages usually
will be awarded in contract actions only upon a satisfactory
showing of fraudulent conduct, some analysis of the cases in
which fraudulent conduct is alleged as a basis for the recovery
of punitive damages is required.
The landmark case in this field is Welborn v. Dixon,128 in
which the South Carolina supreme court permitted the recovery
of what it labeled punitive damages for the fraudulent breach of
contract. The plaintiff had borrowed money from the defendant
and, as security for the debt, had conveyed to him certain parcels
of land. The parties made a concurrent agreement by which defendant promised to reconvey the property upon timely repayment of the debt. The defendant, however, violated the contract and conveyed the property to a third party bona fide purchaser. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought an action seeking both
compensatory and punitive damages. The South Carolina court
declared:
There is no doubt as to the general principle, that in an action
for breach of contract the motives of the wrongdoer are not to
be considered in estimating the amount of damages ....
When,
however, the breach of the contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act, the rule is well settled . . . that the defendant may
be made
to respond in punitive as well as in compensatory damages.129

The Welborn holding has been applied in a large number of
subsequent cases, 130 but any attempt to follow a common thread
128. 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904).
129. Id. at 115, 49 S.E. at 234. There is some question as to the validity of the court's assertion that the award of punitive damages for fraudulent breach was well established in South Carolina. The court relied
principally upon the authority of Rose & Rogers v. Beattie, 2 Nott &
McC. 538 (S.C. 1820). In that case the plaintiff had purchased a lot

of water packed cotton from the defendant in South Carolina. The plain-

tiff had shipped the cotton to England where it was sold. Upon discovering the fraud, the English buyer returned the cotton to the plaintiff's
English agent, who resold the cotton at a reduced price. The question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the price paid
for the cotton in South Carolina or whether he could recover the difference in the two sale prices in England, plus incidental damages. The
court awarded the plaintiff damages according to the latter formula.
It is arguable that the result in Beattie is well within the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1845). See Welborn v.
Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 120-22, 49 S.E. 232, 236-37 (1904) (Woods, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Wright v. Public Say. Life Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 285, 204
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through the decisions is likely to prove frustrating' 31 because the
concept of fraud is so hazy. Many cases could be cited which
illustrate the difficulty, but several from two jurisdictions will
suffice.
In Holland v. SpartanburgHerald-Journal Co.,1 32 the plaintiff and one other person had owned all of the stock of the defendant. The plaintiff sold his stock and controlling interest in the
corporation to a third person under the terms of an agreement
which required that the plaintiff be retained as business manager
of the defendant for at least three years. The board of directors of
the defendant agreed to continue the plaintiff's employment for
three years. The defendant, in violation of the agreement, discharged the plaintiff well before the expiration of his three year
term. The Supreme Court of South Carolina sustained a denial of
punitive damages on the ground that no fraudulent act had been
establish a right to pushown and that mere evil intent does 3not
3
nitive damages for fraudulent breach.
In Sullivan v. Calhoun,14 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a sharecropping agreement. Before the plaintiff could
harvest the crops, the defendant "ran the plaintiff off said premises, gathered the crop, and refused to make an account to the
plaintiff of his part thereof."'3 5 The South Carolina court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had shown
no fraudulent act accompanying the breach and held that the
award of punitive damages was proper.3 6
How can the award of punitive damages in Sullivan and the
denial in Holland be explained? Both defendants acted in violation of their contractual obligations. In Holland, the plaintiff
S.E.2d 57 (1974); West v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 198,
66 S.E.2d 816 (1951); Porter v. Mullins, 198 S.C. 325, 17 S.E.2d 684 (1941);
Sturkie v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 180 S.C. 177, 185 S.E. 541 (1936);
Schultz v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 175 S.C. 182, 178 S.E. 867
(1935); Givens v. North Augusta Elec. & Improv. Co., 91 S.C. 417, 74
S.E. 1067 (1912).
131. Part of the difficulty is caused by the fact that the "rule" in
Welborn has not been expressed with consistency. It is difficult to reconcile, for example, the statements of the rule in Givens v. North
Augusta Elec. & Improv. Co., 91 S.C. 417, 74 S.E. 1067 (1912), and Williams v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 448, 176 S.E. 340 (1934). See
generally Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 444, 451-58 (1958).
132. 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203 (1932).
133. Id. at 468-69, 165 S.E. at 207-08.
134. 117 S.C. 137, 108 S.E. 189 (1921).
135. Id. at 138, 108 S.E. at 189.
136. Id. at 139, 108 S.E. at 189.

1977]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

was evicted from his office and ordered to remove his personal
effects immediately; his salary was also abruptly terminated. In
Sullivan, defendants, in some unspecified way, forced the plaintiff to leave land which he had an absolute legal right to occupy.
Why were the acts of one defendant considered merely wrongful
and the acts of the other specifically found to be fraudulent? It
is true that some South Carolina cases suggest that mere failure
to perform a contract, for example, by withholding money due,
does not constitute fraud.1 37 But the defendants in Holland and
Sullivan both took affirmative steps to breach their contracts.
Perhaps defendant's conduct in Sullivan may have edged closer
to violence or coercion, but the report does not so indicate, and
even if true, are coercion or violence necessary ingredients of
fraudulent conduct? We are left to speculate as to the legal basis
for distinguishing the cases; the court in neither Holland nor Sullivan seemed moved to explain what the term "fraudulent conduct" meant within the context of the action brought or of the
relief sought.
The confusion in the South Carolina cases has its analogue
in other jurisdictions that have adopted variant versions of the
rule permitting the recovery of punitive damages for breach of
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The problem may be
conveniently illustrated by comparing two relatively recent California cases, Contractor'sSafety Association v. California Compensation Insurance Co. 138 and Sharp v. Automobile Club of
Southern California.139
In Contractor's,the defendant insurance company had represented to prospective customers that it would pay dividends according to an established scale provided the customer maintained
a loss-premium ratio below an agreed level. When the plaintiff
filed a claim for a dividend payment according to the published
scale, the defendant refused to pay. The defendant cited a secret
resolution of its board of directors adopted prior to the time plaintiff purchased insurance from the defendant which provided that
no dividends would be paid until approved by further action of
the board. The plaintiff sought punitive damages on the ground
that the defendant's conduct was "fraudulent," "malicious," and
"oppressive."
137. See, e.g., Patterson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 228 S.C.
297, 89 S.E.2d 723 (1955); Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206
S.C. 344, 34 S.E.2d 218 (1945).
138. 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957).
139. 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964).
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The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding:
"The third count though phrased in the language of fraud is
clearly based upon breach of contract. The injury thus complained of is the refusal of the defendant to perform the con0
tract."14
In Sharp, the plaintiff, before renewing his automobile insurance with the defendant, sought and received assurances from
the defendant that the medical payment provisions of the policy
were payable without regard to whether plaintiff received reimbursement from a collateral source. At the time these representations were made, it was not the defendant's policy to pay
medical claims for which reimbursement had been received.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a claim for medical expenses with the
defendant. The defendant refused to pay the claim on the
ground that plaintiff had received payment from his medical
insurer. The plaintiff recovered punitive damages in the trial
court.
The court of appeals sustained the award of punitive damages. The opinion does not raise the question of whether the contractual origin of plaintiff's claim made the recovery improper;
the court clearly considered this an action in fraud.1 4 1 No reference was made to the opinion of the supreme court in Contractor's or to the obstacle the holding in that case might present
to the recovery of punitive damages in Sharp.
Attempts to reconcile the results in these California cases
generate the same confusion as did similar efforts with regard
to the South Carolina cases. While the relevant rule of law applicable to the cases is not stated in precisely the same form in
both states, the focus of the judicial inquiry is essentially the
same. The South Carolina decisions do not explicitly consider
whether the defendant's wrongful conduct partakes more of the
character of tort or contract; the principal task is the identification of a specific fraudulent act. In California, perhaps because
of a statute which ostensibly precludes the recovery of punitive
damages in contract, 42 there is less emphasis upon specific fraud140. 48 Cal. 2d 71, 77, 307 P.2d 626, 629 (1957).
141. 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 652-54, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588-89 (1964).
Although the Sharp court did not specifically discuss the question of
whether it considered plaintiff's claim chiefly tortious or contractual,
later California decisions on similar facts have held such to be actions
in tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. Wetherbee v. United
Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
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ulent acts and more reliance on a generalized inquiry into
whether the plaintiff's claim is principally contractual or
whether it is a tort claim which only incidentally involves contract breach. In both California and South Carolina, however,
the success of the plaintiff in recovering punitive damages depends upon whether he can convince the court that enough facts
have been proven to push his action over the line between contract and tort into a clear delictual category.
The four cases treated above seem hopelessly contradictory;
a wider reading of additional relevant cases in both jurisdictions
does not diminish the confusion. 1 43 While many of the cases in
this area make little sense because the rule which courts purport
to apply is partly an illusion, this is not to say that every
case in which punitive damages are allowed because the defendant committed a fraudulent act concurrent with contract
breach is mystifying. 144 Courts understandably may deny a
non-compensatory award when the defendant is guilty of nothing more than a bare failure to perform the contract. 1 45 Many
cases, however, such as the four we have discussed, fall into an
uncertain twilight zone between "mere" breach and obvious tort.
It is the decisions in this zone that mock pretentions to logical
precision. Confusion in this area of the law is perhaps inevitable,
for it is surely difficult to apply consistently a rule whose cardinal concept (fraud) many courts have persistently defined in the
most sweeping and general terms.14 6 In California, the difficulty
is aggravated because in that state the outcome depends not only
on the meaning of fraud, but also on whether the defendant's tort
is incidental to the breach of contract or whether the contract
breach is incidental to the tort.1 4 7 A rule composed of concepts
143. In South Carolina, for example, consider why the court in
Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 239, 87 S.E.2d 685
(1955), found a fraudulent failure to act and in Branham v. Wilson Motor
Co., 188 S.C. 1, 198 S.E. 417 (1938), found that no fraudulent failure to
act had been established.
144. In Barber v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 108, 200
S.E. 102 (1938), defendant's agent changed the number on a payment
receipt book from a straight life policy for $250 to a health and accident
policy with a death benefit of only $50. The court had no difficulty in
finding a fraudulent act sufficient to sustain the award of punitive damages.
145. Sadler v. Pennsylvania Ref. Co., 31 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.S.C. 1940);
Roberts v. Fore, 231 S.C. 311, 98 S.E.2d 766 (1957).
146. See, e.g., Van Name v. F.D.I.C., 13D N.J. Eq. 433, 23 A.2d 261
(1941); Myers v. Myers, 200 Okla. 683, 199 P.2d 819 (1948); La Course
v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951).
147. Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953);
Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941).
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so obscure can be described as a governing legal doctrine only by
a long leap of faith.
If the rule permitting recovery of punitive damages for
fraudulent breach of contract rests upon deceptive concepts, why
did the courts not discard it long ago? Partly because lawyers and judges find rules, however ghostly, comforting presences, and partly because the rule in this instance provides convenient camouflage for otherwise legally indefensible decisions.
If it were confessed that the rule permitting the recovery of punitive damages for fraudulent breach is largely a iegal chimera,
it would follow that courts that award punitive damages by invoking the rule are permitting non-compensatory recovery for
breaches of contract that are merely malicious or oppressive as
distinguished from fraudulent. Such results come perilously
close to making the aggravated breach of contract the equivalent
of a tort. Few courts are willing to openly acknowledge the destruction of established doctrines of conventional damage law,
finding it much simpler to apply the "rule" by searching the evidence for tell-tale signs of fraudulent conduct rather than to con14 8
fess that the rule they invoke is largely devoid of meaning.

D. BREACH OF CONTRACT ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDEPENDENT TORT
Similar to the exception for fraudulent breach of contract is
the rule that punitive damages may be recovered when the
breach of contract is accompanied by an act that is independently and willfully tortious. 149 Courts recognizing this rule apparently believe that since the basis for awarding punitive damages is the defendant's independent, willful tort, there can be no
148. The "fraud exception" to the general rule that punitive damages
are not recoverable for breach of contract has been a useful escape hatch
for courts in a number of jurisdictions that profess strict adherence to
the general principle of no recovery for punitive damages in contract.
See, e.g., Hocke Productions v. Jayark Films Co., 256 F. Supp. 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Levin v. Nielsen, 37 Ohio App. 2d 29, 306 N.E.2d 173
(C.P.'1973).
149. "Generally, punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of
contract; but where the acts constituting a breach of contract also amount
to a cause of action in tort, there may be recovery of exemplary damages
upon proper allegations and proof of intentional wrong, insult, abuse or
gross negligence constituting an independent tort." Country Club Corp.
v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also
National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644 (W.D.
Va. 1972); Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968); D.L. Fair
Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944); Williams v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1956); A.L. Carter
Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 168 S.W.2d 629 (1943).
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conflict with the general rule merely because the parties' relationship fortuitously rests on a contract. Such an argument may
be superficially persuasive, but it is essentially specious. It assumes too casually that the line between contract and tort may
be precisely drawn; yet marking that boundary line has been
acknowledged by some of our ablest scholars to be among the
most perplexing challenges in the law.150 Recourse to legal
history only exacerbates the difficulty. At early common law,
distinctions between tort and contract were not made because
the forms of action, which controlled plaintiff's right to recovery,
recognized no such categories. 151 Only gradually, and with much
uncertainty, did the law begin to separate and identify concepts
which modern lawyers would recognize as tort and contract.
Even today, this process of historical evolution is not fully understood. 152
Courts frequently recognize that distinctions between tort
and contract are difficult to maintain. 53 Yet so deeply ingrained
is the attachment to established categories that the emphasis in
many opinions is on the development of a test which will allow
the court to separate a mere breach of contract from a contract
breach that also constitutes a tort. The principal test depends
54
upon the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
Under this test, complete non-performance of a contractual duty
amounts to no more than a breach of contract; on the other hand,
a defective attempted performance may rise to the level of a tort.
While the misfeasance-nonfeasance test is not without its defenders, 5 5 the difficulty of establishing what is misfeasance and nonfeasance in a particular case' 56 has limited the utility of these
150. See generally, 5 CoRniN, supra note 3, § 1077.
151. See MfLSOm, supra note 7, at 316.
152. See generally id. at 244-45. See also P. WINaLt, TIE PRovINCE Or THE LAW OF TORTS 116 (1931).

153. See, e.g., Peitzman v. City of Ilmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944);
Frega v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 331, 143 A.2d 885
(1958); International Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union v. Smith,
145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946).

154. W.B. Davis & Son v. Ruple, 222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772 (1930);
Manley v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 47 Ga. App. 496, 170 S.E. 711 (1933);
Chase v. Clinton County, 241 Mich. 478, 217 N.W. 565 (1928); Stone v.
Johnson, 89 N.H. 329, 197 A. 713 (1938); Mulvey v. Staab, 4 N.M. 172,
12 P. 699 (1887).
155. Dean Prosser maintains that, "[m]uch scorn has been poured
on the distinction, but it does draw a valid line between the complete
nonperformance of a promise, which in the ordinary case is a breach of
contract only, and a defective performance, which may also be a matter
of tort." PROSSER, supra note 2, at 614.
156. Southern Ry. Co. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244 (1906);
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concepts in drawing boundary lines between tort and contract 5 7
and in establishing the scope of a defendant's potential liabil15
ity. 8
In attempting to determine whether the plaintiff has established an independent, willful tort in addition to a simple breach
of contract, the limited value of the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction or, for that matter, of any other consistently applied test,
is reflected in the way opinions are written. Generally, appellate
courts content themselves with statements to the effect that mere
evil intent does not constitute an independent tort justifying the recovery of punitive damages in a breach of contract
action. 159 Occasionally, a judge will write a more detailed and
carefully reasoned opinion which attempts to explain the distinction between conduct by the contract breaker which is merely oppressive and actions that are independently tortious. 160 The
more typical decisions, however, consist of a summary statement
of facts to which the court's conclusion is appended.' 6 '
Courts frequently acknowledge that a plaintiff's cause of ac6
tion may be an inextricable mix of tort and contract elements.1 2
Because the facts in such cases do not lend themselves to ready
classification, there is a discernible tendency on the part of some
courts to relax the requirement that a plaintiff prove the existtence of an independent, willful tort as a condition to recovery
of punitive damages. The test in this modified form commonly
requires only that the plaintiff establish that the defendant's conduct was oppressive or malicious. 6 3 If such a standard were
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140, 78 A. 725 (1910); May v.
Tide Water Power Co., 216 N.C. 439, 5 S.E.2d 308 (1939). But see Taylor
v. Atchison Topeka & S.F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
157. Kinnare v. Chicago, 70 IRl. App. 106 (1897), aff'd, 171 Ill. 332, 49
N.E. 536 (1898); Obanhein v. Arbuckle, 80 App. Div. 465, 81 N.Y.S. 133
(1903).
158. See Buskey v. New Eng. TeL & Tel., 91 N.H. 522, 23 A.2d 367
(1941). See also H. SHULMAN & F. JAMES, LAW OF Towirs 1051 (2d ed.
1956).
159. See, e.g., Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 845 (Fla.
1957); Mabery v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d
824 (1952); Success Motivation Inst., Inc. v. Jamieson Film Co., 473
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
160. See the opinion by Judge Pope in McDonough v. Zamora, 338
S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).

161. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d
781 (5th Cir. 1973); Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968).
162.

See generally Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 675, 117 P.2d 331

(1941); Denn v. Denn, 222 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1966); Hankay v. Employer's
Cas. Co., 176 S.W. 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
163. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Kirk v. Safeco
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widely applied or consistently endorsed, it would substantially increase the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract.
While terms such as "malicious or oppressive breach" are perhaps
fully as vague as the concept of a willful, independent tort, they
are not technical legal doctrines trailing behind them a long and
confusing history that inhibits innovative applications. Until
quite recently, however, few, if any, jurisdictions had explicitly
adopted a statement of the rule permitting recovery of punitive
damages under a liberalized standard that requires a showing
only of malicious or oppressive breach. Opinions that seem to
state such a definition are frequently treated in subsequent decisions as aberrant examples of sloppy judicial craftsmanship
which, with careful analysis, may be harmonized with the general
rule that a willful, independent tort must be shown. 6 4
The pattern that emerges from the cases applying the willful tort exception to the general rule should be familiar by now.
Because the distinction between tort and contract is sometimes
elusive, decisions which turn upon that distinction are difficult
to reconcile; 165 result-oriented judicial manipulation is not uncommon. A handful of recent courts have refused to continue
writing opinions which maintain the fiction that the tort-contract
distinction is either easy to draw or is of surpassing significance
in determining the appropriateness of punitive damages. The decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Boise Dodge, Inc. v.
"
Clark'66
is illustrative of this innovative and more candid attitude. The facts in the case are simple. The plaintiff had purchased a "new" automobile from the defendant. The "new" automobile was, in fact, a well-used demonstrator on which the
odometer had been turned back. The plaintiff recovered a judgIns. Co. of America, 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. 1970). See
Delhi Pipeline Corp. v. Lewis, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
164. The opinion of the court in McDonough v. Zamora, 338 S.W.2d
507, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), is typical:
It has been said that punitive damages are permitted when a
breach is accompanied by "willful acts of violence, malicious or
oppressive conduct." . . . However, it is suggested that those
descriptive words may be symptoms of an independent tort,
and that there must be something more than a malicious and
oppressive breach of contract, for even an intentional breach of
contract is not punishable by punitive damages.
(citations omitted.)
165. Compare Associated Heavy Equipment Schools v. Masiello, 219
So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) with Henry Morrison Flagler
Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Also compare
Scheps v. Giles, 222 S.W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) with Orgain v. Butler,
478 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
166. 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969).
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ment which included an award of punitive damages. On appeal,
the defendant argued that since the plaintiff's action was in contract, punitive damages were improperly awarded. In rejecting
defendant's contention, the court said:
In any event, from the legal point of view of the imposition
of punitive damages in this case, it does not matter whether respondent's counter claim technically sounded in contract or tort.
The rule . . . is that punitive damages may be assessed in contract actions where there is fraud, malice, oppression or other
sufficient reason for doing so. The rule recognizes that in certain cases elements of tort, for which punitive damages have al-.
ways been recoverable upon a showing of malice, may be inextricably mixed with elements of contract in which punitive damages generally are not recoverable.167
The forthright reasoning used by the court in Boise Dodge
cuts through many of the conceptual illusions with which we
have been struggling. It is a judicial admission-in direct terms
-that punitive damages should be, and perhaps have been,
more broadly available than the black letter rules suggest.
The important question for the future of the law is whether decisions like those in Boise Dodge are harbingers of fundamental legal change or whether they are isolated examples of judicial candor destined to be overridden by subsequent declarations of fidelity to the orthodox rule.
E.

RECENT CASES: THE

BEGINNING OF CHANGE?

A number of commentators in recent years have professed to
discern potentially significant changes in the rules which have
hitherto restricted the availability of punitive damages for breach
of contract.' 68 It should be clear from the preceding analysis of
the so-called orthodox cases that punitive damages have in fact
been more readily recoverable for breach of contract than many
have supposed. This wider availability of punitive damages over
a long period has been largely unnoticed 16 9 because the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting punitive damages are based
on legal concepts of unusual flexibility. This conceptual flexibil167. Id. at 556 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). For a different result, on similar facts, using the conventional contract-tort test, see
Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Leek, 272 Ala. 544, 133 So. 2d 24 (1961).
168. GLMmORE, supra note 6, at 83; Note, supra note 5; Note, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WmLAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971).
169. Some commentators have sensed that the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract has been greater than the bare repetition of the black letter rules might indicate. See Simpson, supra note
4.
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ity has allowed courts so disposed to sanction the recovery of punitive damages without seeming to impair the continued validity
of the general rule. Certainly there have been variations among
jurisdictions in the liberality with which exceptions to the general rule have been allowed. 170 Yet enough states have been surveyed to permit the conclusion that the phenomenon just described is broadly based. The aim here is not to detract from the
significance of the cases discussed below, or to suggest that they
do not-taken as a whole-represent important steps toward increasing the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract. Historical perspective is necessary, however, if we are to
judge wisely whether the recent cases are the vanguard of significant change or merely evidence a modest, incremental movement
forward that is clearly predictable through a careful reading of
earlier decisions.
A line of cases, originating in California, has sustained the
award of punitive damages in actions originating in the alleged
breach of an insurance contract. Perhaps the most significant of
these cases is Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 17' in which
the plaintiff insured's claim to punitive damages for the bad
faith failure of defendant insurer to pay fire insurance claims
was rejected by the trial court. The California supreme court
reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that "there
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract... that neither party will do anything which will injure
u7 2
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.'
The court thus sanctioned the award of punitive damages in an
action growing out of contract. The court did not, however, acknowledge that it was permitting the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract. Rather it insisted that
liability is imposed .. .not for a bad faith breach of contract
but for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements.
... That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the
terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the
obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law . . .[w] here in
so doing,
it fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured.173
170. See, e.g., notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text.
171. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973).
172. Id. at 573, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484, 510 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958)).
173. Id. at 573-74, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485, 510 P.2d at 1037 (quoting
Crisci v.Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17, 426
P.2d 173, 177 (1967)).
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The holding in Gruenberg, that in every contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith or fair dealing, is fully supported
by an earlier line of California cases. 17 4 Gruenberg itself has
been cited in an unusually large number of later California decisions. 17 5 It has also been relied upon by the courts of other states
as an aid in establishing an implied duty of good faith as a condition for awarding punitive damages in an action growing out of
contract. 7 6 It is especially significant that reliance upon Gruenberg by non-California courts has occurred in some jurisdictions
which have traditionally been firmly against the award of
punitive damages in actions arising in contract.' 7" In sum,
although the Gruenberg rationale has not been uniformly
1 79
adopted, 7 8 its reception has been predominantly favorable.

How significant are the cases both in and outside California
that have adopted the Gruenberg rationale as a basis for awarding punitive damages in a breach of contract action? Viewed
from one perspective, the Gruenberg decision is supported by a
large body of existing case law; the deus ex machina employed
by the Gruenberg court to permit recovery of punitive damages
has made appearances before. The judicial implication of a good
faith duty to perform contractual obligations is similar to the
duty of good faith accompanying a fiduciary relationship. Similarly, we may trace the lineage of the Gruenberg doctrine to
those venerable cases in which punitive damages were awarded
174.

See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.

3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d

425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
175. E.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d
783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America, 45
Cal. App. 3d 170, 119 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1975); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers
Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975).
176. E.g., United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska
1974); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339,
330 N.E.2d 540 (1975); United States Fidel. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Peterson,

91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).
177. Illinois is a state that has consistently refused to allow punitive
damages for breach of contract. See, e.g., Sears v. Weisman, 6 IlL App.
3d 827, 286 N.E.2d 777 (1972); Ash v. Barrett, 1 Ill. App. 3d 414, 274
N.E.2d 149 (1971). With these earlier cases, compare the post-Gruenberg
opinion of the Illinois court of appeals in Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan
for Hosp. Care, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975).
178. See MacDonald v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 232
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The Florida court read the California cases as
mere restatements of the traditional exception that punitive damages for
breach of contract are available if breach is accompanied by an independent, willful tort.
179. See cases cited at notes 175-76 supra.
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against public service companies. 180 In those cases, the award
of punitive damages was justified despite the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties because of the incidental, non-contractual relationship between a public service
company and its customer. It was the breach of that non-contractual duty, so the reasoning went, that allowed the recovery
of punitive damages.
Depending upon the extent to which courts are willing to impose a duty to perform in good faith on the parties to every contract, the Gruenberg decision may have a substantially broader
precedential significance than either the fiduciary duty or public
service company cases. Thus far, the Gruenberg rationale has
been applied only to actions involving the breach of contracts
of insurance, which traditionally have received special treatment
in the law. 181 If, however, as recent scholarship maintains, there
is a duty of good faith "at every stage of the contractual process,
from preliminary negotiation through performance to discharge,
and in nearly all kinds of contracts,' 1 82 the Gruenberg rationale
may reach very far indeed.
Because Gruenberg itself is hardly four years old, however,
it is difficult to judge the significance of its reasoning as a device
for allowing recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract.
The greatest source of uncertainty is the peculiar character of implied duties of good faith. The greatest legal scholars, Holmes
among them, 8 2 have recognized the difficulty of understanding
why the law recognizes implied duties in certain kinds of cases.
Attempting to explicate the forces which move judges to find implied duties or obligations is a most frustrating exercise. Lawyers are trained to believe that the use of legal logic and the
application of established dogma to particular facts will yield predictable results. The wisest scholars and judges, however, have
understood that the formulation of legal policy is not inevitably
an exercise in logic as lawyers understand that term, but the
product of many forces, some grasped quite clearly and others
only dimly understood, which intermingle to produce a decision in
18G. See notes 98-107 supra and accompanying text.
181.

W.

VANCF, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE

114-15 (3d ed.

B. Anderson 1951).
182. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 216
(1968).
183. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAiav. L. Rzv. 457, 465-66
(1897).
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a particular case. 84 Good faith has no definite meaning; 18 5 the
reasons for its invocation in a particular case are not always clear.
We cannot really know why the Gruenberg court and others that
have adopted that decision have chosen to find a duty. Because
this is so, we cannot honestly predict whether Gruenberg represents the beginning of a new treatment of punitive damages in
the law of contracts. As Professor Leon Green wrote so perceptively many years ago:
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties enable a judge to pass judgment? Where shall he find the source
of duties? Do judges find them ready made? . . . Do they create them? . . . We are clearly dealing with the very processes
by which law is generated. And doubtless the questions as to
the paternity of these duties brought forth in case after case is
embarrasing enough at best.186
Even if the Gruenberg decision should become a powerful
progenitor of legal change, it will only serve to mark a transitional point in the law. The decision, depending heavily on the
distinction between a breach of the contract itself, for which punitive damages are not recoverable, and the tortious breach of an
implied duty of good faith, which subjects the contract breaker
to liability for punitive damages, is susceptible to the same criticisms as the more general exception for independent torts.1s As
an attempt to maintain, in theory at least, the traditionally sharp
distinction between damages recoverable in contract and in tort,
the line drawn in Gruenberg and later decisions is of dubious
validity. So long as courts continue to act on the apparent belief that it is important to distinguish between remedies available
for breach of contract and for tort, however, and are content
to write opinions indicating that there is a meaningful distinction
between a mere breach of contract and tortious violation of a
duty of good faith performance, the law of punitive damages in
88
contract will continue to be shifting and ill-defined.1
184. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoT.u.
L. Rv. 1014 (1928).
185. Summers, supra note 182, at 201.
186. See Green, supra note 184, at 1024.
187. See notes 148-67 supra and accompanying text.
188. It is surprising how frequently attempts to break down the barriers between tort and contract are resisted. Even Dean Prosser, who
clearly recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between tort and contract, wrote:
The first question which arises in this curious dichotomy
is when a breach of contract is also a tort. It is obvious that this
cannot be true in every case, or there would be no distinction
left at all; and that the more or less inevitable efforts of lawyers
to turn the one into the other must somewhere be brought to a
halt.
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Recent decisions, however, have sustained the award of punitive damages in a contract action on grounds which go beyond the
Gruenberg rationale. The holdings in these cases are not based
on the alleged breach of an implied duty of good faith; rather it
is the breach of the contract itself which is said to constitute the
tortious act for which punitive damages are recoverable. The decision of the Indiana court of appeals in Vernon Fire and Casualty InsuranceCo. v. Sharp' 89 is an important example. In Vernon, the defendant insurer refused to pay the plaintiff's legitimate claim for property and equipment fire losses incurred at
plaintiff's factory. The defendant could offer no reasonable explanation for its refusal. The trial court's award of punitive
damages was sustained on appeal. The appellate court held that
"the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the
insurer's conduct amounted to heedless disregard of the consequences, malice, gross fraud or oppressive conduct."'190 It is particularly significant that, as authority for its holding, the court
cited, without comment, cases in which punitive damages were
awarded but in which no contract was at issue.' 9' In short,
the Vernon opinion can be read as eliminating any basis for treating the award of punitive damages in a contract action as subject
to a materially different standard than that used in the ordinary tort case.' 92 The Vernon opinion is not an isolated example of advanced judicial thinking. A number of other recent
cases, not limited to suits in which an insurance company is a defendant, have been reported in which punitive damages have
93
been awarded in contract actions on similar grounds.
Prosser, supra note 105, at 387. More recently, some scholars have
expressed the view that perhaps there is no reason why breach of contract should not simply be a species of tort. See Poulton, Tort or Contract, 82 LAW Q. Rav. 346, 350-51 (1966).
189. 316 N.E.2d 381 (Ind.Ct. App. 1974), modified on other grounds,
349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.1976).
190. Id. at 384.
191. Id. Among other cases, the court cites True Temper Corp. v.
Moore, 299 N.E.2d 844 (Ind.Ct. App. 1973).
192. See note 194 infra.
193. See, e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392
F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I. 1975); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). Other
courts, while rejecting the award of punitive damages in the case before
them, have clearly intimated that punitive damages for breach of contract may be recovered under a liberal standard similar to the rule announced in Vernon. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501
P.2d 368 (1972); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43
(1!75).
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The significance of the development represented by decisions
like Vernon is difficult to judge. Viewed independently of the
judicial environment from which they evolved, these cases seem
to be of undeniably great significance as straightforward statements by various courts that the breach of a contract itself can
justify the award of punitive damages without need to resort to
any of the established exceptions to the general rule. Such judicial declarations come quite close to making every breach of contract a species of tort. 9 4 Yet in assessing the impact of cases like
Vernon, it is especially important that they not be viewed in isolation either from the accumulated body of past decisions or from
the ongoing process of contemporary decision making. The majority of contemporary courts continue to render decisions consistent with the traditional rule that punitive damages may not
be recovered for breach of contract. 195 Indeed, in a few jurisdictions which have traditionally adhered to a somewhat more liberal standard in the award of punitive damages, there is evidence
of a retreat to more orthodox territory. 196 In sum, it seems fair
to say that the law is in the midst of a potentially significant
change, but that the reach and durability of that change are uncertain.
Moreover, the conclusion that Vernon and its companion
cases represent a change of immense significance is undermined
by examination of earlier cases which suggest that the general
rule denying punitive damages in contract cases has never really
been the impenetrable barrier it has appeared to be. Many of the
194. To observe that every breach of contract may be considered a
tort is not to say that punitive damages are recoverable for every breach
of contract. The implication of the Vernon decision and others like it
is that punitive damages will be available for breach of contract on essentially the same grounds that they are now recoverable in tort. Punitive damages in tort are generally recoverable only upon a showing of
aggravated or reckless conduct. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 9-10. That
same limitation will doubtless apply to all attempted recoveries of punitive damages for breach of contract.
195. See, e.g., Davis Cattle Co., Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 393
F. Supp. 1165 (D. Col. 1975); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cobum, 209
S.E.2d 655, 132 Ga. App. 859 (1975); Tax v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla.
1974); White v. Rob Roy Dairy, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1974).
196. In Texas, a state that has been considered more liberal than
some others in the award of punitive damages for breach of contract,
recent cases manifest an intention to apply a more strict standard to
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp.
v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); White v. Rob Roy Dairy,
Inc., 524 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Boswell v. Hughes, 491 S.W.2d
762 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Chief Justice Ramsey's dissenting opinion in
Boswell is of special note. Id. at 764.
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so-called established exceptions to the general rule simply have
afforded traditional courts more latitude in escaping the strictures of the rule without seeming to violate it. In some
jurisdictions, the so-called exceptions have been construed
broadly enough to raise doubts as to the continuing viability of
the rule. Then, too, there has long existed a small body
of cases which reflect a sporadic and largely unremarked judicial inclination to award punitive damages on quite liberal
grounds. 197 These earlier cases suggest that decisions like Vernon really represent an outgrowth of a heretofore camouflaged
doctrine rather than the announcement of any startlingly new legal principles. Against this background, the much heralded recent cases seem less significant as exemplars of legal change.
Thus, the most that unequivocally may be said about decisions like Vernon is that they evidence a tendency to decide directly what many earlier courts had been at pains to conceal:
there really are no insurmountable theoretical objections to the
award of punitive damages for breach of contract on a basis similar to that which governs in the typical tort case, that is, where
defendant's conduct is oppressive or malicious. Doubtless there
is much to be said for this increase in judicial candor.
Wide adherence to the rationale of the Vernon decision would
greatly enhance the clarity of existing doctrine in this area of
damage law. More than this, the Vernon court's approach would
make the results in many decided cases conform more closely
with the courts' explanations for their decisions. The legal principles which constitute the law of punitive damages in contract
would thus be more rational and the results produced by the
application of those principles more predictable-not insignificant objects of reform.
However significant the nascent changes in this area of the
law ultimately may prove to be, 198 we should do more than
merely describe the results of cases which trace out the developing pattern of change. It is important that we explore and seek
to understand the reasons why, at this time in the development
197. See, e.g., Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251, 280 P. 942 (1929); Anchor
Co. v. Adams, 139 Va. 388, 124 S.E. 438 (1924); Gatzow v. Buening, 106
Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
198. It is too early to speculate-as some commentators have-that
decisions like Vernon, which appear to liberalize the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract, constitute the irresistible wave of
the future. See Note, supra note 5, which assumes, without explanation, that the progress of cases which broaden the availability
of punitive damages is inevitable. Id. at 689.
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of law, courts have begun to award punitive damages for breach
of contract without resort to the doctrinal smoke screen of such
traditional exceptions as the separate fraudulent act or an independent, willful tort rule.
The recent cases extending the availability of punitive damages in contract have, of course, increased the scope of a defendant's potential liability, a result consistent with the broader tendencies of modern damage law. Professor Gilmore has characterized this development as "an explosion of liability."'199 A persuasive, but partial, explanation for the expansion of punitive
damages in contract cases may be found in changing perceptions
of the proper social roles of great economic power and of those
who wield it. The corporation is the most typical form through
which economic power is exercised, and it is the large and powerful corporation which frequently possesses sufficient economic
leverage to exploit the relative weakness of the other party to
a contract. In view of this economic reality, it should not be
surprising that many of the most important recent cases awarding punitive damages in contract involve an ordinary consumer
200
as plaintiff and a large insurance company as defendant.
It cannot be doubted that contract damage has been shaped
historically by prevailing attitudes toward the economic system. Professor Richard Danzig has persuasively argued that
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale2 01 was at least partly the
result of the perceived need to shelter the corporate entrepreneur from excessive liability in order to promote desired industrial development. 20 2 The character and the function of the
corporation have changed greatly since the mid-nineteenth century. It is axiomatic that the large, modern corporation no
longer unites ownership and management in the same hands, and
that shareholders of the typical public corporation have little
voice in the conduct of corporate affairs. 20 3 Indeed, some economists argue that the large corporation has grown so powerful
that the corporation itself rather than market forces controls
20 4
what goods will be produced and distributed.
199. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 65.
200. See cases cited at notes 175-76 supra.
201. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
202. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization
of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUms 249 (1975). Professor Danzig does not
contend that the rule in Hadley was wholly the product of the economic
climate then prevailing. He does suggest that the dominant economic
values of the day played some part in the court's decision.
203. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MoDERN CORPORATION AND PaiVATE PROPERTY 112-16 (rev. ed. 1968).
204. Perhaps the dominant recent spokesman for the view that the
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The conviction that the modern large corporation controls
the market is by no means universally shared.20 5 Yet recent developments in damage law sometimes reflect a preoccupation
with the conviction that corporate power is often abused and that
the corporation's freedom to act is not such an unalloyed good
that it should be encouraged at the expense of competing values.
Contemporary contract law emphasizes concepts such as unconscionability and the relative bargaining power of parties to agreements.20

6

Such doctrines are open-ended and unformed, 20 ' but

they have been used to restrict the power of strong parties to unfairly shape contractual terms to their advantage. 208 The growing availability of punitive damages for breach of contract is consistent with the recent emphasis in substantive contract law on
doctrines designed to protect against the abuse of bargaining
power, 209 because the award of punitive damages increases the

severity of sanctions which may be imposed on a contract breaker
210
who has engaged in sufficiently egregious conduct.
There have been surprisingly few attempts to explain the
causes of this growing judicial willingness to award punitive
damages for breach of contract. The occasional efforts that have
been made emphasize the disparity of economic power that may
exist between the aggrieved party and the breaching party, arguing that the inquiry must focus on the question of whether the
plaintiff is a "big guy" or a "little guy."21 ' Presumably, the
plaintiff who has been victimized by the defendant's abuse of
concentration of corporate power has destroyed the central role of the

free market is Professor J.K. Galbraith. His views are set forth at length
in J. GALBRAITH, TaE NEw INDusTRTAL STATE (2d ed. rev. 1971).
205. See, e.g., Solow, The New Industrial State or Son of Affluence,
9 PuB. INTERwST 100 (Fall 1967); Gordon, The Close of the Galbraithian System, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 635 (1968).
206. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1963); American Home Improvement Co. v.
MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
207. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1041, 1042-44 (1976).
208. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
209. For a somewhat critical view of the principal doctrines of the
new contract learning, see Sullivan, Book Review, 17 Wm. & MARY L.
Ry. 403, 412-16 (1976).
210. Judicial concern about the abuse of corporate power in the bargaining process has not been confined to the modem era. See note 102
supra and accompanying text.
211. D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REmunmis § 3.9, at 206-07
(1973). See Note, supra note 5.
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superior bargaining power will recover punitive damages, under
the rationale of the newer cases. There is evidence to support
this thesis. If we consider cases decided even under the traditional exceptions to the general rule, judgments were frequently
rendered which may be viewed as attempts to punish the abuse
of superior bargaining power. 212 An examination of the newer

cases likewise confirms the importance of the parties' bargaining
power as a central factor in the decision. Specifically, cases
which have adopted the Gruenberg rationale have usually involved corporate defendants who wield much greater market
power than the typical consumer-plaintiff. 213 Even in a number
of newer cases in which the award of punitive damages was considered but disapproved, the courts' opinions suggest that the relative bargaining power of the parties, as an aspect of the economic context within which the transaction occurred, made some
difference in the court's analysis. 21 4 Finally, in the broader field
of modern contract law, recent scholarship indicates that the relative bargaining status of the parties is a useful predictive tool
in rationalizing seemingly conflicting results in cases which present similar issues.

21 5

Thus, the thesis that disparity in bargaining power explains
212. The public services exception, see text accompanying notes 97106 supra, is readily explainable as a means of preventing abuse of the
monopoly power held by such defendants as railroads or public utilities.
Inequality in bargaining power may also be a helpful touchstone in reconciling seeming conflicts among fraudulent breach of contract cases.
See text accompanying notes 121-43 supra. Thus in Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S.C. 137, 108 S.E. 189 (1921), for example, the successful plaintiff was a sharecropper; the defendant was his landlord. In Sharp v.
Automobile Club of Calif., 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1964), the winning plaintiff was an ordinary consumer. The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S.C. 454,
165 S.E. 203 (1932), and Contractors Safety Ass'n v. California Comp.
Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957), were both experienced in
business and both arguably possessed economic leverage that share-

croppers or ordinary consumers would not have. Certainly decisions

like those in Gruenberg, Vernon, and their progeny may be seen as
aiming at the chastisement of those who have abused great bargaining
power.
213. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App.
3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.,
44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975).
214. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d
43 (1975); Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst., 51 Mich. App. 220, 214 N.W.2d
864 (1973).
215. See Childres & Spitz, Status of the Law in Contract,47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1 (1972). Professors Childres and Spitz convincingly demonstrate
that in cases applying the parol evidence rule, results are dependent
upon the status of the contracting parties.
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the increase of punitive damage awards in contract cases is persuasive. But it must be kept in reasonable perspective: the recent cases are too few in number to support any sweeping conclusions as to the cause of the developing trend toward more liberal
punitive damage awards. Firm conclusions must await the slow
unfolding of the judicial process.
V.

CONCLUSION

The title of this Article refers to the reality and the illusion
of legal change. A careful analysis of the role of punitive damages in the law of contract suggests the difficulties inherent in
determining what meaningful legal change is. It is a relatively simple matter to examine a handful of recent cases and
to proclaim that a major doctrinal upheaval is at hand. In assessing the significance of any asserted legal change, it is more useful
but more difficult to examine the recent cases within the historical context of which they are an inseparable part.
Recent decisions rendered in a number of jurisdictions justify
the conclusion that legal barriers to the award of punitive damages in contract are being lowered. Do these recent decisions
represent a significant legal change which lends support to Professor Gilmore's conviction that tort and contract principles are
beginning to converge? A fair answer would be a qualified yes.
The answer must be qualified because, as we have seen, the traditional rules rigidly proscribing the award of punitive damages
in contract have frequently yielded quite surprising results. We
have noted, for example, older cases sanctioning the award of
punitive damages by the creation of "independent duties" or
"fiduciary obligations," the breach of which-in the court's analysis-offered a way out of the dilemma posed by the traditional
rule. These older decisions clearly suggest that judicial sympathy for the award of punitive damages in selected contract
actions is not altogether newly-minted. While it is true that
many of the post-Gruenberg cases may be viewed as a predictable stage in a process of orderly judicial evolution, they are
less circumspect and more explicitly innovative in their approach
to the award of punitive damages in contract than the older decisions. In sum, Gruenberg and its progeny represent genuine legal change, but a change quite firmly connected to an earlier
line of cases that produced similar results by more oblique means.
In assessing the value of the evolving new standard, it should
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be clearly understood that punitive damages in contract cannot
be considered consistent with the traditional descriptions of the
objects of contract damage law. 216 Damages for breach of contract theoretically are aimed at compensating for pecuniary loss,
while punitive damages-originating in tort cases-are given
to compensate for specifically non-pecuniary injuries. Yet too
much can be made of the inconsistency between the theory
of punitive damages and the traditional aims of contract damage law. The boundary line between tort and contract is not always clear. It was in cases that resisted easy categorization as
either tort or contract that courts began to expand the availability of punitive damages. Some recent decisions sanctioning
the award of punitive damages in contract do not manifest much
concern as to whether the plaintiff's claim falls on the tort or
contract side of the borderline. This judicial attitude may be
more casual than calculated, but it suggests that the most important question for future legal scholars may be not whether punitive damage awards are consistent with contract damage principles, but rather, what is the likely effect of the recent cases on
the continued integrity of distinctions between contract and tort,
and what are the implications of undermining those distinctions.
Legal change is rarely revolutionary. The collapse of the
tort-contract distinction is not imminent, but recent decisions liberalizing the availability of punitive damages in contract have
contributed to a process of change which has greatly increased
the territory occupied by Dean Prosser's shadowy borderland between tort and contract. How rapidly it may proceed and where
it will ultimately lead, no careful scholar can confidently predict.

216. In practice, of course, contract damages are both more speculative and thus more "punitive" than the statements of this traditional rule
intimate. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.

